The recent surge in the international migration of high-skilled workers not only raised standard concerns about adverse brain-drain effects for developing countries but also led to worries about native high-skilled workers in advanced destination countries. 1 Domestic workers with higher education levels fear that their wages will decline in response to increased competition from similarly qualified migrants. Whereas debates on migration in the past have centered on asylum rights and low-skilled migrants, over the years, politicians and the mass media have discovered the issue of high-skilled immigration. For instance, in Switzerland and Austria, the discussion has recently become emotionally charged owing to significant inflows of tertiary-educated workers, particularly from Germany.
2 For the United States, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2009) find that skilled natives tend to oppose immigration in states with a relatively skilled mix of immigrants more than in states in which the skill composition of immigrants features a high proportion of low-skilled immigrants. Similarly, a recent panel study by Müller and Tai (2010) for Europe suggests that higher-skilled workers have less favorable attitudes toward immigration when immigrants are more skilled relative to the average skill level in the destination country.
This paper examines whether domestic skilled workers have reason to oppose high-skilled immigration and, vice versa, whether nonmigrating high-skilled workers win or lose from brain drain in source countries. We argue that the international migration of high-skilled workers triggers productivity effects at the macro level such that the wage rate of skilled workers may rise in host countries and decline in source countries. By exploiting data on international bilateral migration flows from Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) , we empirically examine the impact of an increase in high-skilled emigration rates on log differences in GDP per capita, total factor productivity (TFP), and the wage income of skilled workers between pairs of source and destination countries.
We propose a range of instrumental variables to address the potential reverse causality problem that arises when international wage differences affect individual migration decisions (e.g., Lucas, 2005; Egger and Radulescu, 2009; Grogger and Hanson, 2011 ).
Our theoretical model suggests that even when considering adjustments in educational decisions, an increase in high-skilled emigration (immigration) lowers (raises) the domestic skill intensity in production. 3 This relationship has two effects on the relative wages of high-skilled workers between destination and source economies.
First, for a given TFP and as a consequence of the declining marginal productivity of a certain type of labor, high-skilled workers lose in the destination economy and win in the source economy. However, external effects of migration on TFP (positive in destination, adverse in source) may reverse this result. The net effect of high-skilled migration on international wage differences is thus theoretically ambiguous. This theoretical approach makes the relationship between high-skilled migration and wages an empirical question.
Our analysis suggests that, if anything, the external productivity effect is likely to dominate. Moreover, because of complementarity between high-skilled and low-skilled labor, an increase in low-skilled migration unambiguously benefits high-skilled workers in the receiving country.
Our findings are consistent with the recent literature on the wage effects of highskilled immigration in single countries. Borjas (2003) and Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005) provide evidence for a small but positive impact of an inflow of immigrants with a college degree on wages for college-educated natives in the United States and United Kingdom, respectively. Similarly, Friedberg (2001) suggests that native wages may rise after immigrants enter high-skilled occupations in the Israeli labor market. Our empirical contribution is to provide international evidence for the theoretical possibility of positive wage effects in destination countries relative to source countries. We exploit data on bilateral migration between country pairs, thereby complementing single-country studies on labor market effects of immigration.
Another strand of literature has emphasized the positive effects of brain drain on market income in the source economy (e.g., Mountford, 1997; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1997; Rapoport, 2001, 2008) . This possibility arises from the idea that an increase in immigration quotas in advanced countries improves immigration prospects for skilled workers in developing countries and thereby raises incentives to acquire education. However, empirically, the net effect on the size of the skilled labor force appears to be positive, except for very poor countries and/or countries with low levels of human capital (Beine et al., 2001 (Beine et al., , 2008 . In our theoretical framework, brain drain reduces the skill intensity in the source country, even when educational decisions are adjusted. Because our empirical framework investigates the effect of skilled migration on relative outcomes between destination and source, we do not test the alternative hypothesis advanced in the "brain gain" literature. We can conclude, however, that the destination country tends to gain more from skilled migration than the source country.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a simple theoretical model. The model provides the basis for the empirical analysis in section II on the effects of higher emigration on relative GDP per capita, relative TFP, and the relative wage income of skilled workers between the source and the destination. The last section provides concluding remarks.
I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our theoretical analysis shows that the presence of the external productivity effects of skilled labor implies that in response to an increase in high-skilled migration, the wage level of educated workers may increase in the host country relative to the source country.
Set Up
Consider two economies, home and foreign. There is a homogenous consumption good, which is chosen as the numeraire. Output Y is produced under perfect competition according to the technology
where H and L denote the high-skilled and low-skilled labor inputs, respectively, A is TFP, the function F is linearly homogenous,
denotes the skill intensity of production, and
Furthermore, f is increasing, strictly concave, and fulfills the standard boundary conditions.
Before migration, there is (for simplicity) the same number N of individuals/workers in both countries. There is a positive external effect of a higher concentration of skilled labor,
where a is an increasing function. This assumption captures human capital externalities as formalized, for instance, by Lucas (1988) in the context of endogenous growth. These human capital externalities may arise from learning spillover effects across workers, increased innovation activity in firms, and better institutional quality in a country, which may be associated with a more highly skilled domestic population. The empirical literature on human capital externalities is somewhat inconclusive but is mostly supportive. For instance, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) find modest evidence in favor of human capital externalities from secondary schooling, whereas Ciccone and Peri (2006) find no evidence. Iranzo and Peri (2009) argue in favor of strong human capital externalities from college graduates in the United States but not from an increased share of high school graduates. In a recent study, Gennaioli et al. (2011) find strong empirical evidence of human capital externalities. They employ a new data set with 1569 subnational regions from 110 countries and argue that human capital is the primary driver of regional development. Moreover, they complement their finding with firm-level evidence on regional education levels for productivity and find large effects. The authors conclude that the previous empirical literature has underestimated the magnitude of human capital externalities. Similarly, Hunt (2011) employs a U.S. state panel data set for the period from 1940 to 2000 to show that an increase in the share of the immigrant college graduate population of one percentage point increases the number of patents per capita by 9-18 percent. This is strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that skilled immigration increases TFP.
Each individual decides whether to become skilled and whether to migrate. Both skilled and unskilled individuals are internationally mobile, but they may differ in i θ θ if i is unskilled. The modeling of migration costs as discounted consumption follows Stark et al. (1997) As will become apparent, the equilibrium outcome is the same regardless of whether we assume that migration possibilities are already considered in the education decisions of individuals. This condition is an implication of the simplifying assumptions that (i) learning abilities and migration costs are uncorrelated and (ii) individual migration costs are the same for all workers within a skill group.
Derivation of Testable Hypotheses
We will now derive the testable hypotheses. For this purpose, we treat migration as exogenous. According to equations (1) and (2), competitive factor prices are as follows:
According to equations (3) and (4) 
Therefore, all individuals with learning costs below some endogenous threshold level, e , which depends on domestic wages only, become skilled:
. As the skill intensity, k , increases, the wage rate of unskilled individuals relative to skilled individuals,
consequently, more individuals remain unskilled, indicating that the threshold learning cost e is lower.
The fraction of domestically born unskilled workers, U , is given by
. The effective units of skilled labor in the home country per native, before migration, are given by
Denote by S m and U m the fraction of skilled and unskilled labor units emigrating to the foreign country ("emigration rates"), respectively. After migration, we have
, respectively. Therefore, using equations (9) and (10), the skill intensity at home,
, is implicitly given by
, we see that the right-hand side of equation (11) 
, TFP in the foreign (host) country relative to the home (source) country can be written as
according to equation (2). Moreover, according to equation (5), the relative wage rate for skilled workers is
Define the elasticities of the skill intensity at home and in the foreign country with respect to the migration of skilled and unskilled labor from the home country to the foreign country:
Note that the elasticities are defined such that they are positive: 
respectively. Therefore, if the effect of a change in the skill intensity (triggered by migration) on the education decision is small (i.e., the magnitude of derivatives
are small), the model predicts that an increase in the migration rate of skilled labor ( S m ) has a positive effect on relative destination-to-source TFP (α ).
Moreover, an increase in the migration rate of unskilled labor ( U m ) has a positive but small effect on α because the migration of unskilled labor only has an indirect TFP effect by lowering education incentives in the source country (and vice versa in the destination country). By contrast, as a result of human capital externalities ( 0 , > * ε ε ), the emigration of skilled labor also has a direct TFP effect on skilled labor input per native ( h ) in the source country (and, again, vice versa in the destination country). The effect is mitigated because an increase in S m fosters education incentives in the source country (and provides disincentives in the destination country).
Second, the elasticity of the destination-to-source relative wage income of skilled labor (
) with respect to the emigration rate of skilled and unskilled labor is given by
respectively. Therefore, the impact of the migration of unskilled labor (increase in U m )
on the relative destination-to-source wage income of skilled labor is unambiguously positive. The relative TFP increases as a result of education effects, and the resulting increase in skill intensity k reduces the wages of skilled labor in the source country (and vice versa in the destination country, where the skill intensity decreases). By contrast, for a given TFP, the wage rate of skilled labor decreases with the skill intensity; therefore, the impact of the migration of skilled labor (increase in S m ) on the relative destinationto-source wage income of skilled labor ( H ω ) is ambiguous, even if the relative destination-to-source TFP (α ) increases. Only if the TFP effects are sufficiently large owing to human capital externalities does an increase in S m increase H ω .
In sum, we predict that an increase in the emigration rate of high-skilled labor We have focused the theoretical analysis on the predictions of the effects of migration, although we allowed individuals to consider the migration decision when choosing education. Because migration is endogenous according to the model and depends (inter alia) on international wage differences, the model also indicates an empirical endogeneity issue, which we try to address by using instrumentation strategies.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our theoretical analysis has highlighted the effect of the emigration of highskilled and low-skilled labor on TFP differences and the wage income gap of skilled labor to potential host economies of expatriates. We have seen that there may be counteracting channels by which skilled migration affects the wages of skilled workers:
the external TFP effects of migration and the effect on the marginal productivity of skilled labor when TFP is held constant.
The direction from (wage) income differences to migration flows has been examined empirically elsewhere. Two recent papers are notable. First, Grogger and
Hanson (2011) provide convincing evidence for the critical role of wage differences between country pairs on the emigration patterns of tertiary educated workers. 7 Second, Beine et al. (2011) show that in addition to wage differences, network effects are important for the migration decisions of both high-skilled and low-skilled workers. The authors show that emigrants already living in the destination country positively affect migration flows.
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Our analysis complements research on the interaction between wage differences and skilled migration by focusing on the opposite direction, the impact of migration on both international (wage) income differences for skilled workers and TFP differences between country pairs. Inter alia, we instrument skilled migration with past migration stocks, as suggested by Beine et al. (2011) .
Data and Estimation Strategy
The emigration rate of highly skilled individuals is our main explanatory variable. 
Equation (23) (14) and (13) (table A1) .
As indicated, although recent empirical literature has focused on the impact of income differences on migration patterns, we aim to examine the opposite channel. In a first attempt to address endogeneity, we replace the high-skilled emigration rate in 2000
by the lagged one in 1990, denoted by SMig ij,t-1 , in OLS regressions. Doing so allows for the possibility that the TFP effects of the migration flows of skilled workers (for instance, through innovation activity) take time to come into effect.
Second, we explore potential instruments for the high-skilled emigration rate for 2000. We use the lagged rate of expatriates in 1990 emigrating from country i to j , denoted by TotalMig ij,t-1 , as an instrument for SMig ij,t , thereby predicting the rate of highskilled emigrants by the lagged rate of all emigrants. This approach is motivated by the notion that a larger percentage of emigrants from a certain source country already living abroad act as a signal to potential high-skilled migrants regarding the destination country's openness and its administrative bodies' treatment of foreigners. The presence of more emigrants to a certain destination creates mobility cost-reducing network effects for potential emigrants (e.g., Massey et al., 1993; Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2011 received in country j in 1960. Because our empirical strategy focuses on emigration rates rather than stocks, we divide this measure by (100 times) the population size of source country i to obtain an estimate for the past bilateral emigration rate. 15 The fraction of high-skilled migrants before 1960 was comparatively low; therefore, potential effects of past migration should only work through induced high-skilled emigration. In other words, the instrument should be uncorrelated with the dependent variable, which is supported by J-tests.
Results
Reported standard errors from all estimates account for destination clusters, following Grogger and Hanson (2011) , among others.
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Tables 2-4 address the potential problem of reverse causality by providing instrumental variable estimations of (23). The upper panels report second-stage results, whereas the lower panels in tables 2 and 3 report the partial correlations of the instruments in the first stage.
We start with the results for relative GDP as a dependent variable in table 2. In columns (1) and (2), we use the total emigration rate from country i to j in 1990
(TotalMig ij,t-1 ) as a single instrument. In columns (3)-(6), the bilateral geographical distance between i and j (Dist ij ), an indicator for a common border (Contig ij ), and an indicator for the common language of the source and destination countries (ComLang ij ) are used as instruments in addition to the total emigration rate. We use TotalMig ij,t-1 in columns (3) and (4) and our proxy for the total emigration rate for 1960, TotalMig ij,1960 , in columns (5) and (6). As in table 1, we control for the lagged relative values of school enrollment, private investment, and urbanization and include source country fixed effects (results not shown). The effect of high-skilled migration on log GDP differences between the destination and the source country is positive, as in the OLS estimations. All estimates suggest a significant and higher effect of skilled migration on relative GDP compared to the OLS estimates in table 1. Columns (2), (4), and (6) also control for the (lagged) low-skilled migration rate in 1990, UMig ij,t-1 . We observe that the coefficient on
β in equation (23), is not significantly different from zero and does not alter the coefficient of the instrumented variable SMig ij,t in an important way.
Columns (7)- (12) in table 2 present the results for relative TFP analogously to columns (1)- (6). The results are similar to those for relative GDP: the estimated effect of high-skilled migration is always positive and increases compared with OLS estimates, whereas low-skilled migration is not significant. In particular, the estimates of 1 β in columns (7)- (12) (1)- (2) and (7)- (8) suggests that migrants who arrive through social networks have a particularly high impact on international differences in (log) wages of skilled workers. Migrants who arrive through social networks appear to find it easier to integrate into the host country and thus have a larger effect on TFP (possibly being employed in jobs that are more suitable to their qualifications) than workers without social networks.
In fact, we cannot rule out that skilled immigrants work in different jobs than they do in the source country, often earning wages that are within a lower percentile of the wage distribution than at home. For instance, a university degree in a developing source country may reflect a lower acquired skill level than a university degree in an OECD destination country. Moreover, a skilled immigrant may occupy a low-skilled job briefly after arrival owing to language problems in the destination country. We account for these possibilities by using as the dependent variable the log difference between the wage of the median in the destination country and the 80th percentile in the source country, RelWage80to50 ij,t .
<<table 4 about here>>
The results are reported in table 4. Columns (1) and (2) We conduct a further sensitivity analysis (see table S.1 to S.4). 19 This analysis suggests that our conclusions are fairly robust overall. First, we include destination fixed effects rather than source fixed effects. The results with destination fixed effects are similar to those with source fixed effects. 20 We also examine whether results are sensitive to a specific destination country. We run "rolling" regressions, in which we omit one destination country each time, to confirm that the results are basically unchanged.
Second, we include regional dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether the source country also belongs to the OECD 21 instead of fixed effects as controls to consider institutional differences, which may affect income differences, in an alternative way.
Third, we employ an emigration data set by Defoort (2006) to construct an alternative proxy for the total emigration rate. The data set contains emigration to six important destination countries in the year 1975. The proxy is constructed analogously to equation (24) and is used as an instrument for the skilled migration rate. Finally, we use the stock of high-skilled and low-skilled migrants rather than migration rates as regressors. Our main conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged and overall robust.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of an increase in the international bilateral migration of high-skilled and low-skilled workers on relative income and relative TFP between pairs of source and destination countries of expatriates. Our theoretical model suggested that an increase in the number of skilled migrants increases international wage inequality by adversely affecting TFP in the source economy and increasing it in the host economy. Our empirical analysis provided evidence which is consistent with this hypothesis. Using a data set on the bilateral emigration of skilled workers, our results
suggested that an increase in high-skilled emigration rates tends to slightly increases TFP differences and therefore (albeit also slightly) wage income for skilled workers in destination countries relative to source countries in a causal way. None of our estimations suggested that skilled workers in the destination country lose from skilled migration relative to the source country. Finally, skilled workers in the receiving countries unambiguously gain from low-skilled migration. with endogenous education choice that shows how migration is triggered by a decrease in the mobility costs of high-skilled workers and how it may evolve over time. In the present paper, we focus empirically on the effect of higher international migration. (9) and (10), respectively.
6 Without a loss of generality, we label the foreign country the host country.
7 In Grossmann and Stadelmann (2008) , we presented evidence for the interaction between emigration flows and income changes using a structural equation model. However, we examined the impact of a higher aggregate emigration stock of a country on its per capita income. That is, we did not consider bilateral relationships.
8 This finding suggests that there exist mobility-cost reducing network effects from communities of people from the same nation and from friends and relatives already living abroad (see also Massey et al., 1993) .
9 See Docquier and Marfouk (2006) for a detailed discussion concerning data collection and construction issues. Inquiry data is available online at http://www.nber.org/oww/.
11 We also included data for Turkey for the year 1994.
12 Another way to capture the effect of mobility cost-reducing network effects is to use the past total number of migrants instead of the past emigration rate as the instrument for contemporaneous migration. We confirm that the results do not change. 13 Countries with negative net emigration are coded to have an emigration rate equal to zero.
14 The measure is inspired by Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011) . They use a similarly constructed proxy as an instrument for the total diaspora of migrants in 1990
(rather than the high-skilled emigration rate).
15 Calculating partial correlations confirms that the past total emigration rate is well correlated with the high-skilled emigration rate in 2000. 16 We use the Huber-White method to adjust the variance-covariance matrix from our least squares results. Note: All dependent variables are expressed in logs and represent relative differences between countries j and i. SMigij,t denotes the stock of high-skilled emigrants from country i living in country j divided by the stock of high-skilled residents in i. RelInvestij,t-1, RelUrbanij,t-1, RelPrimSchoolij,t-1 and RelTertSchoolij,t-1 denote the lagged relative investment share, relative urbanization share, relative primary school enrollment, and relative tertiary school enrollment between j and i. Table A1 in the appendix provides additional information on all variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered for migration destinations. *** indicates a significance level below 1 percent; ** indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 percent; * indicates a significance level between 5 and 10 percent. Note: All dependent variables are expressed in logs and represent relative differences between countries j and i. SMigij,t (UMigij,t-1) denotes the stock of high-(low-) skilled emigrants from country i living in country j divided by the stock of high-(low-) skilled residents in i. All estimations include RelInvestij,t-1, RelUrbanij,t-1, RelPrimSchoolij,t-1 and RelTertSchoolij,t-1 as additional control variables. TotalMigij,t-1, Distij, ComLangij, and Contigij represent the share of the emigrant population from country i living in country j, the distance between i and j, whether i and j share a common language, and whether i and j have a common border, respectively. Table A1 in the appendix provides additional information on all variables and instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered for migration destinations.*** indicates a significance level below 1 percent; ** indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 percent; * indicates a significance level between 5 and 10 percent. Note: All dependent variables are expressed in logs and represent relative differences between countries j and i. SMigij,t (UMigij,t-1) denotes the stock of high-(low-) skilled emigrants from country i living in country j divided by the stock of high-(low-) skilled residents in i. All estimations include RelInvestij,t-1, RelUrbanij,t-1, RelPrimSchoolij,t-1 and RelTertSchoolij,t-1 as additional control variables. TotalMigij,t-1, Distij, ComLangij, and Contigij represent the share of the emigrant population from country i living in country j, the distance between i and j, whether i and j share a common language, and whether i and j have a common border, respectively. Table A1 in the appendix provides additional information on all variables and instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered for migration destinations.*** indicates a significance level below 1 percent; ** indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 percent; * indicates a significance level between 5 and 10 percent. Note: All dependent variables are expressed in logs and represent relative differences between countries j and i. SMigij,t (UMigij,t-1) denotes the stock of high-(low-) skilled emigrants from country i living in country j divided by the stock of high-(low-) skilled residents in i. All estimations include RelInvestij,t-1, RelUrbanij,t-1, RelPrimSchoolij,t-1 and RelTertSchoolij,t-1 as additional control variables. TotalMigij,t-1, Distij, ComLangij, and Contigij represent the share of the emigrant population from country i living in country j, the distance between i and j, whether i and j share a common language, and whether i and j have a common border, respectively. Table A1 in the appendix provides additional information on all variables and instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered for migration destinations.*** indicates a significance level below 1 percent; ** indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 percent; * indicates significance level between 5 and 10 percent. 2000 or 1990) divided by stock of residents of educational category "high" in country i in year t. Stock of emigration and stock of residents of educational category "high" from Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) .
